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I consider a final-oﬀer arbitration model in which the oﬀers are submitted sequen-
tially, the parties are allowed to accept oﬀers, and the arbitrator maximizes Nash’s
social welfare function. I show that backwards induction in this three-period model
leads to the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of Rubinstein’s infinite-horizon
alternating-oﬀer bargaining game.
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1 Introduction
Bargaining theory has two pillars: Nash’s axiomatic bargaining solution, and Rubinstein’s
solution to the infinite-horizon bargaining with alternating oﬀers. Nash (1950) has shown
that if one wants to satisfy certain assumptions, then he must maximize the multiplication
of the payoﬀs, which will be called the Nash’s social welfare function hereafter. Rubinstein
(1982) has shown that an infinite-horizon bargaining game with alternating oﬀers has a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium. The two solutions are close when the discount rate is close to 1
(Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1987)), but they are distinct in general.
On the other hand, in formal negotiations, some alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
are used if the parties do not reach an agreement before a certain deadline. An important
mechanism is final-oﬀer arbitration, introduced by Stevens (1966), in which the arbitrator
has to choose between the oﬀers submitted by the parties. In the United States, final-oﬀer
arbitration is frequently used to resolve interest disputes in public-sector employment and to
determine the salaries of professional baseball players.
It turns out that these three important pieces in dispute resolution share an interesting
story. If the arbitrator maximizes Nash’s social-welfare function in the final-oﬀer arbitration,
then the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of arbitration is precisely the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome in Rubinstein’s infinite-horizon bargaining game with
alternating oﬀers. The equivalence remains intact when there are negotiations before the
arbitration.
In formal negotiations, the parties often impose a deadline. When the deadline is short,
however, the mechanism used at the deadline usually has a large impact on the outcome of the
negotiation in equilibrium, introducing a bias in favor of one party. The result above points out
a way to impose a deadline without aﬀecting the bargaining outcome, regardless of how short
the deadline is. It is using final-oﬀer arbitration with an arbitrator who maximizes Nash’s
social-welfare function.
A more theoretical contribution of this paper to the bargaining theory is that the equi-
librium dynamics of the model developed here does not resemble to the dynamics in usual
bargaining models. As the paper demonstrates, unlike in the usual models, the actions of
players have great impact on the equilibrium behavior of future players, and that is why the
outcome of two-period negotiation here is the same as the outcome of the infinite-period ne-
gotiation in usual setup.
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2 Final-Oﬀer Arbitration with Sequential Oﬀers
There are two negotiators, namely 1 and 2, and an arbitrator. Negotiators are to jointly choose
a pair (x, y) from a convex, compact set X, where X ⊂ R2+ is understood to be the set of all
feasible expected utility pairs for the negotiators after normalizing the disagreement payoﬀs to
(0, 0) ∈ X. There are three dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. At date t = 0, Negotiator 1 submits an oﬀer
(x0, y0) ∈ X to the arbitrator. The oﬀer is observable to Negotiator 2, who decides whether to
accept the oﬀer, ending the game with (x0, y0), or wait and submit her own oﬀer (x1, y1) ∈ X
to the arbitrator at t = 1. Again, at t = 1, the oﬀer (x1, y1) is observable, and Negotiator
1 decides whether to accept. If he accepts the oﬀer, (x1, y1) is chosen and the game ends.
Otherwise, the arbitrator makes the decision at t = 2, by choosing
(x2, y2) ∈ {(x0, y0) , (x1, y1)} .
(In final-oﬀer arbitration, the arbitrator has to choose one of the submitted oﬀers.) If (x, y)
is chosen at t, then the payoﬀs of negotiators 1 and 2 are δtx and δty, respectively. The
arbitrator’s utility function at t = 2 is Nash’s (1950) social welfare function:
uA (x, y) = xy.
The arbitrator’s time preferences need not be specified because he moves only once. This
perfect-information game is referred to as sequential final-oﬀer arbitration model.
I make the following standard assumption: the function
f : x 7→ max {y| (x, y) ∈ X}
is concave, continuous, strictly decreasing; f (0) > 0 , and f (x¯) = 0 for some x¯.
There are two crucial modeling assumptions. First, the parties are allowed to accept the
oﬀers before the arbitrator makes a decision. This assumption commonly holds in real life. In
fact, in the Major Baseball League, in 80% of the cases that are submitted to an arbitrator,
the parties settle before the arbitrator makes a decision, which takes a month (see for example
Wilson (1994)). Second, the oﬀers are made sequentially. This assumption is sometimes natural
because the party who files a case with an arbitrator has an incentive to submit his oﬀer with
the application and let the other party know what the oﬀer is.
3 Transferable-Utility Case
In order to illustrate the main idea, consider the transferable utility case, in which X =
{(x, y) |x+ y = 1}. Here, I exclude the Pareto-inferior payoﬀs for clarity. At the last period,
maximizing Nash’s social welfare function, the arbitrator chooses the oﬀer that is closer to
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(1/2, 1/2). Now suppose that Negotiator 2 oﬀers (x1, y1) such that x1 is closer to 1/2 than
x0 is. Negotiator 1 would not reject such an oﬀer because the arbitrator would select (x1, y1)
in the next period anyway. If x0 is closer to 1/2, then he accepts (x1, y1) if x1 ≥ δx0, as
(x0, y0) would be selected next day if he rejects the oﬀer. Therefore, in equilibrium, Negotiator
2 counteroﬀers (x∗1 (x0) , 1− x∗1 (x0)) with
x∗1 (x0) = min {δx0, 1− x0} . (1)
Notice that x∗1 (x0) is maximized at x
∗
0 = 1/ (1 + δ), which is the equilibrium oﬀer in Rubin-
stein’s model. In the first period, if Negotiator 1 oﬀers x∗0, then the other negotiator would
accept that oﬀer because she is indiﬀerent between paying x∗0 in the first period and paying
x∗1 (x
∗
0) = δ/ (1 + δ) in the next period. If he asks a higher payoﬀ x0 > x
∗
0, she rejects it be-
cause such a high demand x0 allows her to counteroﬀer a low payoﬀ x∗1 (x0) in the next period,
enticing her to wait. Indeed,
1− x0 < δ/ (1 + δ) < δx0 = δ (1− x∗1 (x0)) ,
showing that accepting x0 at t = 0, which yields 1 − x0, is worse than couteroﬀering x∗1 (x0)
at t = 1, which yields δ (1− x∗1 (x0)). But since the counteroﬀer depends on the initial oﬀer,
Negotiator 1 may still prefer to oﬀer such x0 if it leads to a better counteroﬀer x∗1 (x0). It turns
out that this is not the case: δx∗1 (x0) < δ/ (1 + δ) < x
∗
0. Could he get a higher payoﬀ than x
∗
0
by oﬀering x0 < x∗0 and receiving a better counteroﬀer x
∗
1 (x0)? The answer, again, turns out
to be negative because x∗1 (x0) is increasing in that region. Therefore, he oﬀers x
∗
0 = 1/ (1 + δ)
in the first period, and the oﬀer is accepted–as in Rubinstein’s infinite-horizon model.
The dynamics of the counteroﬀers here does not resemble to the dynamics in usual bar-
gaining models. In usual bargaining, the past actions do not have any impact on the future
behavior. When Negotiator 1 makes his oﬀer, he takes the future counteroﬀers and the other
negotiator’s acceptance threshold given. On the other hand, in the sequential final-oﬀer ar-
bitration model, the past actions do aﬀect the future equilibrium actions. The arbitrator’s
decision depends on the two oﬀers, and the counteroﬀer depends on the initial oﬀer. Now
Negotiator 1 tries to aﬀect the counteroﬀer and possibly the arbitrator’s choice by his oﬀer. In
doing so, he ends up oﬀering what he would have oﬀered in infinite-horizon bargaining model
of Rubinstein. Two main forces lead him to make such an oﬀer. First, a higher optimal coun-
teroﬀer x∗1 (x0) makes Negotiator 2 more willing to accept x0. Second, the optimal counteroﬀer,
x∗1 (x0) = min {δx0, 1− x0}, is maximized at the equilibrium oﬀer in Rubinstein’s model.
4 Preliminaries
This section describes the subgame-perfect equilibrium (henceforth SPE) in Rubinstein’s model











Figure 1: Rubinstein’s solution (on left) and the indiﬀerence curves of Nash’s social welfare
function (on right)
Rubinstein’s solution There is a unique SPE in Rubinstein’s (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-









, and Negotiator 2 accepts it. Rubinstein’s solution is illustrated on the left
panel of Figure 1. Fixing the payoﬀs of Negotiator 1, scale down the payoﬀs of Negotiator 2
by δ, obtaining a curve that is defined by y = δf (x). Now fixing the payoﬀs of Negotiator
2, scale down the payoﬀs of Negotiator 1, obtaining another curve, defined by x = δf−1 (y).

















Indiﬀerence Curves of Nash’s Social Welfare Function For any (x0, y0), the indif-
ference curve {(x, y) |xy = x0y0} that contains (x0, y0) is plotted on the right-hand panel
of Figure 1. If (x0, y0) is the Nash bargaining solution, then the indiﬀerence curve is tan-
gent to the Pareto frontier, with a unique intersection at (x0, y0). Otherwise, the indiﬀer-
ence curve intersects the Pareto frontier twice. Let the best intersection for Negotiator 2 be
γ (x0, y0) ≡ (g (x0, y0) , f (g (x0, y0))). Note that g (x0, y0) is the smaller of the two solutions to
the equation
g (x0, y0) f (g (x0, y0)) = x0y0. (3)
The indiﬀerence curves of Nash’s social welfare function and the Rubinstein’s solution xR














of Negotiator 2 are on the same indiﬀerence curve. Indeed, multiplying


















This equality is another way to define xR, as it has a unique solution, and it will be the crucial
step in the proof of the main result.
5 Main Result
Proposition 1 The outcome of the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the sequential final-
oﬀer arbitration model is the same as the outcome of the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium








and Negotiator 2 accepts the oﬀer.
Proof. I will now apply backward induction, by breaking the ties towards an equilibrium.
At t = 2, given (x0, y0) and (x1, y1), the arbitrator will choose
(x2, y2) =
(
(x1, y1) if x1y1 ≥ x0y0
(x0, y0) otherwise.
(Since Negotiator 2 moves second, in equilibrium, arbitrator chooses (x1, y1) in case of indif-
ference.)
Now consider a t = 1 history in which Negotiator 2 oﬀers (x1, y1) after rejecting (x0, y0).
Suppose that x1y1 ≥ x0y0. Then, Negotiator 1 foresees that if he rejects the oﬀer (x1, y1), in
the next period, the arbitrator will choose the same decision (x1, y1). That is clearly worse
than accepting the oﬀer at t = 1. Therefore, Negotiator 1 accepts the oﬀer. Now suppose
that x1y1 < x0y0. Then, rejection leads to implementing (x0, y0) at t = 2 with payoﬀ δ2x0
to Negotiator 1, while acceptance leads to implementing (x1, y1) at t = 1 with payoﬀ δx1 to
Negotiator 1. Hence, Negotiator 1 will accept the oﬀer if and only if
x1 ≥ δx0.
Now consider the node at which Negotiator 2 is to make an oﬀer after rejecting (x0, y0). It
is not a best reply for Negotiator 2 to make an oﬀer that will be rejected: as we have just seen,
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such an oﬀer will lead to the choice of (x0, y0) at t = 2, while he can get γ (x0, y0) accepted at
t = 1, leading to a higher payoﬀ. Therefore, Negotiator 2 oﬀers (x∗1 (x0, y0) , y
∗
1 (x0, y0)) where
x∗1 (x0, y0) = min {g (x0, y0) , δx0} (5)
and
y∗1 (x0, y0) = f (x
∗
1 (x0, y0)) . (6)






, and the oﬀer will
be accepted, as desired. The proof consists of three steps.






, it is accepted, yielding the payoﬀ of xR for
Negotiator 1.























will be implemented at t = 1–precisely
as in the SPE of Rubinstein’s model. As in that model, Negotiator 2 is indiﬀerent between
accepting and rejecting the oﬀer, and he accepts in equilibrium.
Step 2 : Any oﬀer (x0, y0) with x0 > xR is rejected and leads to a payoﬀ strictly less than
xR for Negotiator 1.
Proof of Step 2 : Note that (x0, y0) is in a lower indiﬀerence curve. Hence,






= δxR < δx0, (7)
where the equality is by (4). Hence, by (5) and (6),
x∗1 (x0, y0) = g (x0, y0) (8)
and





where the inequality follows from (7) and the fact that f is strictly decreasing. Therefore,








> f (x0) ≥ y0,
where the equality is by (2), the next inequality is by the fact that f is strictly decreasing,
and the last inequality is by definition of f . Since Negotiator 2 gets y0 from acceptance and
δy∗1 (x0, y0) from rejection, she rejects the oﬀer (x0, y0), as claimed. To see the second part of
the claim, note that, by (5) and (7), the continuation payoﬀ for Negotiator 1 after such an
oﬀer is
δx∗1 (x0, y0) = δg (x0, y0) < δ
2xR.
Step 3 : Any oﬀer (x0, y0) with x0 < xR leads to a payoﬀ strictly less than xR for Negotiator
1.
6
Proof of Step 3 : If (x0, y0) is accepted, the payoﬀ is x0 < xR. If (x0, y0) is rejected, then
the continuation payoﬀ, by (5), is
δx∗1 (x0, y0) ≤ δ2x0 < xR,
proving the claim.






is xR, which is strictly
higher than the continuation value from any other oﬀer, as established by Steps 2 and 3.






, and it is accepted by Step 1.
Proposition 1 establishes that in a model of final-oﬀer arbitration in which the parties
are allowed to accept the other parties’ oﬀers the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is the
same as the one in Rubinstein’s infinite-horizon bargaining model. As we will see later, this
equivalence remains intact when the parties are allowed to negotiate before the arbitration.
It is crucial for Proposition 1 that the oﬀers are made sequentially. If the parties submit the
oﬀers simultaneously, as in the existing literature, the result is diﬀerent. In that case, both
parties oﬀer the arbitrator’s ideal payoﬀ, which is the Nash’s bargaining solution in our case
(Crawford, 1979).
A basic intuition can be gleaned from the optimal counteroﬀer
x∗1 (x0, f (x0)) = min {g (x0, f (x0)) , δx0}
to a Pareto optimal oﬀer (x0, f (x0)), where the share of Negotiator 2 is f (x∗1). In choosing x0,
Negotiator 1 has an incentive to maximize the counteroﬀer x∗1 because Negotiator 2 is more
willing to accept oﬀers when x∗1 is higher (and f (x
∗
1) is lower). Clearly, as shown in Figure
2, δx0 is increasing in x0 and g (x0, f (x0)) is decreasing in x0. Therefore, x∗1 (x0, f (x0)) is
maximized at x0 with
g (x0, f (x0)) = δx0.
This is precisely the equation (4) that defines the Rubinstein’s oﬀer xR. The equality is quite
intuitive. If Negotiator 1 makes a greedy oﬀer at t = 0, then Negotiator 2 would counter it
with a slightly more equitable oﬀer, which leads to a slightly higher social welfare according
to Nash. (The counteroﬀer is accepted because it would have been selected by the arbitrator
anyway.) On the other hand, if Negotiator 1 makes a less greedy oﬀer and Negotiator 2 happens
to reject it, then Negotiator 2’s counteroﬀer would simply extract the gain from implementing
the original oﬀer at t = 2 rather than a period later. The equation equalizes these two
incentives, which is also the property of Rubinstein’s solution under equal discount rates.
6 Negotiation before Arbitration
I now introduce more rounds of alternating-oﬀer negotiation prior to arbitration. If the par-






Figure 2: The payoﬀ x∗1 of player 1 counteroﬀered by player 2, as a function of the initial oﬀer
x0 of player 1.
between the last two oﬀers in the negotiation, then the SPE outcome will be precisely as in
the Rubinstein’s infinite-horizon model. This is simply because at round T − 2 the outcome
will be as in the Rubinstein’s infinite-horizon model, and this leads to the Rubinstein’s SPE
actions in the earlier rounds by the fixed-point property of the alternating-oﬀer bargaining.
Here, I will consider a more interesting model of endogenous arbitration instead.1
Endogenous Final-Oﬀer Arbitration Model Suppose that the possible dates are all
natural numbers {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Negotiators 1 and 2 negotiate. At each t, one of the negotiators–
Negotiator 1 at even dates and Negotiator 2 at odd dates–makes and oﬀer, and the other
negotiator decides whether to
• accept the oﬀer, ending the game, or
• reject it and file for an arbitration in the next period, or
• reject it and remain in the negotiation.
In the arbitration, the party who files the case submits an oﬀer to the arbitrator. The
other party either accepts it or submits a counteroﬀer to the arbitrator (rejecting the former
oﬀer). The party who files the case, may accept the counteroﬀer or rejects it, in which case
the arbitrator selects between the two oﬀers and the game ends. The payoﬀs and the set X
are as before.
Note that the only diﬀerence between filing a case and remaining in the negotiation is
that in the latter case the party also triggers an arbitration procedure with his oﬀer, ending
1This extension came out of a discussion with Alp Simsek.
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the game after two more periods. Moreover, as in the usual bargaining models with outside
options, only the responder has an option to file a case, presumably the proposer could not file
a case when he has an oﬀer that is not rejected yet.
The main result extends to this case intact:
Proposition 2 The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the endogenous final-oﬀer
arbitration model is the same as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of Rubinstein’s








and Negotiator 2 accepts the oﬀer.
Proof. Since we can take the arbitration procedure as the outside option of the responder,
the result follows from the result of Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989). Now, by Proposition
1, the value of going into final-oﬀer arbitration, which is the responder’s outside option, is
precisely the same as remaining in the negotiation. Therefore, the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome is the same as the one in Rubinstein’s model with no outside option.
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